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I. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT I. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN DENYING MRS. 
AHLUWALIA'S REQUEST FOR CUSTODY, POSSESSION OF THE MARITAL 
RESIDENCE AND IN CONSEQUENTLY ORDERING CHILD SUPPORT. 
Two areas of evidence that were crucial to the 
appropriate decision on the custody issue were completely ignored 
by the Trial Court. 
A. The Trial Court clearly and wrongly ignored the 
requirement of Roendahl v. Roendahl 240 Utah Adv. Rpt. 25 (Utah 
App. 1994) which referenced at page 26, Utah Code Annotated §30-3-
10 regarding the fact that a Trial Court must consider, among other 
factors, which parent is most likely to allow the child frequent 
and continued contact with the non-custodial parent. The Trial 
Court is required to consider this element regarding custody. No 
finding on the record below exists to show that the Trial Court 
considered this issue. 
The evidence at trial was clear that Mr. Ahluwalia made 
obvious and blatant attempts to interfere with Mrs. Ahluwalia's 
visitation relationship with her children by asserting that the 
Plaintiff should be out looking for a job rather than being with 
her child. (Tr. at R. 207, 209, 252-253). As cited in her 
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Appellant's brief, the case of Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah 
App. 1990) states at page 411 that the custodial parent has a duty 
to foster the child's relationship with the non-custodial parent. 
The evidence at trial was undisputed that Mrs. Ahluwalia 
had been the primary care taker and care provider for the minor 
children. (Tr. at R. 182-183) The evidence was undisputed that 
Mrs. Ahluwalia had caused the children to develop into good, well 
adjusted children, (Tr. at R. 182-183), and that she. had made the. 
hard decision to remove stress in their lives by separating herself 
from Mr. Ahluwalia. (Tr. at R. 209-210). Mrs. Ahluwalia obviously 
knew how to foster children in their growth and relationships. 
In the testimony of Elizabeth Hickey, she could not 
testify that Mr. Ahluwalia would foster the relationship of the 
children with their mother, while she could testify that their 
mother would do so. (Tr. at R. 185-187). The evidence at trial 
was undisputed that Mr. Ahluwalia failed to foster the parent/child 
relationship when he had the chance to do so. (Tr. at R. 207-209, 
252-253). The Trial Court ignored this most critical issue, and as 
a result the decision on the issue is clearly erroneous and must be 
reversed. 
B. The Court below really wanted to leave the children 
in the family home, and to leave them together. Those were the two 
keys to the decision. The custody evaluator indicated that stress 
in the family was relieved once there was a separation of the 
parties and had Mr. Ahluwalia rather than Mrs. Ahluwalia left the 
home, the same result in terms of relieving stress in the family 
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would have likely occurred (Tr. at R. 183-184), In other words, a 
principal reason the children had flourished in the care of their 
father is because stress was removed from the family and the 
children would have flourished whether the mother or father 
remained as the custodial parent* 
Consequently, to decide that at a later time the children 
were better off than they were at the time of separation, credit 
must be given to the primary cause of that positive result. In 
this instance the primary cause of the positive result was the wise 
yet extremely painful decision of a mother that would rather remove 
herself away from her children, leaving them where they would be 
physically safe, in order to eliminate a serious emotional 
condition of the home. According to the wisdom of King Solomon, 
such a mother truly would be the one with the children's best 
interests at heart. 
While it is true that the case law generally holds that 
the facts at the time of trial are the facts upon which the custody 
decision should be based, this particular circumstance presents a 
compelling counter-argument to that general rule. The Plaintiff 
testified that she moved out of the home because her presence in 
the home was creating so much stress in the family, she believed 
that it was in the children's best interest to relieve that stress 
(Tr. at R. 209-210). That is exactly the situation that occurred. 
To fail as the Court below did, to give Mrs. Ahluwalia credit for 
her perception and sacrifice, when she clearly did not simply 
abandon the family, but created a situation where there could be 
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healing and things could and did get better, was clear error by the 
Trial Court and must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT II. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN DENYING MRS. 
AHLUWALIA'S REQUEST FOR ALIMONY. 
The Trial Court and Mr. Ahluwalia both concluded that 
Mrs. Ahluwalia had not made what they considered to be a 
"reasonable effort" to support herself since separation. Where in 
all the literature of divorces in the State of Utah is a 
requirement found that a woman who has been at home, as a mother 
and primary care-taker of minor children, in order to justify her 
request for alimony, must show that she has made a "reasonable 
attempt" to support herself since separation? That requirement 
cannot be found in the law of the State of Utah. Yet, it was the 
primary element of the Court's conclusion regarding the alimony 
issue. 
There is law in our State that the Trial Court must make 
specific findings regarding the needs of both the payor and payee 
as well as the ability of each to earn income and make specific 
findings regarding both those issues prior to making an award of 
alimony. See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990). The 
decision regarding the payee's ability to support his or her self 
must be made independent of any analysis of the property 
distribution of the parties. See Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 
(Utah App. 1992) . 
It is a totally different finding to determine the 
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ability of a party to earn income versus a decision about what that 
party has done by way of effort to earn income since the 
separation. 
The Trial Court, in a mean-spirited attack on a long term 
stay-at-home mother, ignored the undisputed evidence at trial that 
Mrs. Ahluwalia left a "tenured" teaching position in Florida to 
follow and support the career of her husband to Pennsylvania and 
thereafter Utah. (Tr. at R. 177-179, 147-152, 157). There is 
nowhere in the literature of divorce law in the State of Utah a 
reguirement that at every step along the way the spouse now 
reguesting alimony must have made "reasonable efforts" in each of 
those circumstances to obtain employment. 
Contrary to the Trial Court's view of the law, if Mrs. 
Ahluwalia had made absolutely no effort to gain employment at any 
time prior to the trial, the Court would still have the same 
decision to make. That decision would have been as cited in the 
cases above, i.e. what is Mrs. Ahluwalia's ability to earn a 
living? Regarding a 17 year marriage, to consider only what 
temporary earnings, or earnings less than those available in the 
field of a party's training and experience would provide, and to. 
attach too much importance to such earnings, is clear error on the 
part of the Trial Court. 
Mrs. Ahluwalia testified that she had applied at all the 
local school districts for employment but had not been able to 
obtain full time employment at the time of trial. Mrs. Ahluwalia 
did everything that she could do in this geographic area in order 
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to obtain employment in her professional field and had not been 
successful in obtaining any such employment at the time of trial. 
(Tr. at R. 150-152, 157) That evidence is uncontroverted. 
The Trial Court gave no weight at all to Mrs. Ahluwalia's 
professional training or work history in her profession. The Trial 
Court completely ignored the desire of Mrs. Ahluwalia to continue 
to reside in the geographic area where her children were and where 
her children wanted to remain. The Court in effect told Mrs. 
Ahluwalia that if she could not find a teaching job in this 
geographic area, she should move away from her children to obtain 
work or she was not worthy of assistance from the man and family 
she had left her job for in Florida early in this marriage. The 
Trial Court ignored the fact that Mrs. Ahluwalia had left her 
professional field at the request of her husband to support him in 
his for the vast majority of the marriage. 
The Trial Court ignored all standards of fairness, 
decency and equity in imputing income to Mrs. Ahluwalia for times 
when she was not working. The evidence was uncontroverted that the 
job she had only paid for the days she worked, and was not a 
salaried position, even though when the work was available she 
worked 3 8 hours per week. The Court created a new obligation for 
alimony consideration that unless a person seeks to maximize their 
ability to support themselves prior to the divorce trial, they 
apparently do not deserve alimony. See Findings of Fact nos. 19, 
20, 21, 27 and 28. 
The Trial Court's approach is totally contrary to Utah 
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law which holds that in the event that Mrs. Ahluwalia could not 
obtain a job in the teaching field in which she was trained, an 
award of rehabilitative alimony would be appropriate. See Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991). This Court has clearly set 
forth that where there is a discrepancy in the earnings between 
professionals that discrepancy should be addressed and resolved 
through an appropriate award of such rehabilitative alimony. See 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), Thronson v. Thronson, 
810 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1991), Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 
1988) and Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992). 
The standard of living to which Mrs. Ahluwalia was 
accustomed, the discrepancy in the earnings and needs of the 
parties to equalize the standard of living was addressed in 
testimony at trial. (Tr. at R. 139, 158-162, 177-178, 228-249, 262-
263). See also Trial Exhibits 2, 15 and 17. 
As with the other critical evidence referenced above, the 
Trial Court ignored the issue of the parties standard of living. 
The Court made an incorrect finding that Mr. Ahluwalia could not 
afford to pay alimony. The Trial Court ignored the fact that Mr. 
Ahluwalia went on a spending spree after the parties' separation, 
incurring a loan for a vehicle that cost four times the amount of 
any other vehicle ever previously purchased by the parties. (Tr. 
at R. 241). The Court called Mrs. Ahluwalia's expenses of $1500.00 
per month "somewhat inflated". See Finding of Fact no. 27. Yet, 
when Mr. Ahluwalia listed $400.00 per month for entertainment that 
he never previously spent, the Court made no comment or finding 
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regarding that issue. (Tr. at R. 245). 
The evidence the Court ignored regarding Mr. Ahluwalia's 
ability to pay, clearly establishes error by the Trial Court. When 
that evidence is coupled with a fair analysis of the parties' 
standard of living, Mrs. Ahluwalia's need, her work history and 
training, alimony must be awarded in this 17 year marriage. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The primary care-taker of the children, who cared for 
their needs and improved their quality of life even by making the 
painful decision to move out of the home, should have been awarded 
custody in this matter. Mrs. Ahluwalia clearly met all the 
criteria necessary in order to be awarded custody of the minor 
children, and consequently possession of the marital residence and 
child support. Mr. Ahluwalia clearly failed to meet several of the 
critical criteria for being awarded custody. To fail to have 
awarded custody to Mrs. Ahluwalia was clear error by the Trial 
Court and should be reversed. 
That the Trial Court gave absolutely no weight to Mrs. 
Ahluwalia's training, prior work history, length of the marriage, 
sacrifice for the family by leaving her tenured teaching position 
in Florida to support her husband's career and that the Court made 
no findings concerning any attempt to equalize the standard of 
living of the parties was clear error by the Court on the alimony 
decision. Such decision must be reversed and Mrs. Ahluwalia must 
be given an opportunity to rehabilitate herself. Mrs. Ahluwalia 
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respectfully requests that in the event the Court of Appeals agrees 
and reverses the Trial Court, that it set the alimony award 
in its decision, since Judge Frederick has clearly shown an 
unwillingness to award any consideration for Mrs. Ahluwalia's 
efforts to this family. 
DATED this y^tkday of AJZl^^ly^ , 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard N. Bigelow 7\ 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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